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SubjectRe: [PATCH] p9caps: add Plan9 capability devices
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On 17.02.2018 23:11, Richard Weinberger wrote:

Hi,

>> +static LIST_HEAD(caphash_writers); >> +>> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);>> +>> +struct crypto_ahash *hmac_tfm
= NULL;>> +>> +static int caphash_open(struct inode *inode, struct file
*filp)>> +{>> + struct caphash_writer *tmp = NULL;>> +
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();>> + int retval
= 0;>> + struct list_head *pos, *q;>> +>> + /* make sure
only one instance per namespace can be opened */>> +
mutex_lock(&lock);>> +>> + list_for_each_safe(pos, q,
&(caphash_writers)) {>> + tmp = list_entry(pos, struct
caphash_writer, list);>> + if (tmp->user_ns == user_ns)
{>> + pr_err("already locked in this namespace\n");>
> So, evil guy opens the device but does not close it, therefore the
> whole service is blocked in a namespace?

Yes, exactly as specified. There may be only one host factotum running,
which can create caps. It's an important security feature.

> In general, I think we should open that device in
> kernel_init_freeable() and hand over the fd to init/systemd.

That would require an customized init and factotum, and wouldn't be
Plan9 compatible.

>> +static int caphash_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>> +{
>> + int retval = 0;
>> + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
>
> Why not obtaining the user namespace from the open file?
> That way one can close a caphash file hande she never opened.
> Think of open, followed by nsenter, ...

hmm, good point.

>> + list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &(caphash_writers)) {
>> + tmp = list_entry(pos, struct caphash_entry, list);
>
> list_for_each_entry.

what's the exact difference ?

>> +static ssize_t capuse_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
>> + size_t count, loff_t *f_pos)
>> +{
>> + ssize_t retval = count;
>> + char *rand_str, *src_uname, *dst_uname;
>> + u8 hashval[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
>> + char *cmdbuf;
>> +
>> + if (!(cmdbuf = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL)))
>
> count is unbound, please apply a limit check.

ok.

>> + {
>> + char *walk = cmdbuf;
>
> cmdbuf is toxic, make sure it is at least nul-terminated.

ok.

>> + if (hmac_tfm)
>
> IS_ERR()? Otherwise you free a error value, if crypto_alloc_ahash() fails.

ok


--mtx

--
Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
Free software and Linux embedded engineering
info@metux.net -- +49-151-27565287

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