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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 01/13] audit: add container id
On Sat, Apr 21, 2018 at 10:34 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 2018-04-18 19:47, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
>> > emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>> >
>> > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
>> > the form /proc/PID/containerid where PID is the process ID of the newly
>> > created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an
>> > additional task added to a container.
>> >
>> > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
>> >
>> > This will produce a record such as this:
>> > type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519903238.968:261): op=set pid=596 uid=0 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 auid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 opid=596 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123455 res=0
>> >
>> > The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are
>> > the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process
>> > being "contained". Old and new container ID values are given in the
>> > "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
>> >
>> > It is not permitted to self-set, unset or re-set the container ID. A
>> > child inherits its parent's container ID, but then can be set only once
>> > after.
>> >
>> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
>> > ---
>> > fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
>> > include/linux/audit.h | 16 +++++++++
>> > include/linux/init_task.h | 4 ++-
>> > include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
>> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
>> > kernel/auditsc.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> > 6 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

...

>> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
>> > index d258826..1b82191 100644
>> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>> > @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct {
>> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>> > kuid_t loginuid;
>> > unsigned int sessionid;
>> > + u64 containerid;
>>
>> This one line addition to the task_struct scares me the most of
>> anything in this patchset. Why? It's a field named "containerid" in
>> a perhaps one of the most widely used core kernel structures; the
>> possibilities for abuse are endless, and it's foolish to think we
>> would ever be able to adequately police this.
>
> Fair enough.
>
>> Unfortunately, we can't add the field to audit_context as things
>> currently stand because we don't always allocate an audit_context,
>> it's dependent on the system's configuration, and we need to track the
>> audit container ID for a given process, regardless of the audit
>> configuration. Pretty much the same reason why loginuid and sessionid
>> are located directly in task_struct now. As I stressed during the
>> design phase, I really want to keep this as an *audit* container ID
>> and not a general purpose kernel wide container ID. If the kernel
>> ever grows a general purpose container ID token, I'll be the first in
>> line to convert the audit code, but I don't want audit to be that
>> general purpose mechanism ... audit is hated enough as-is ;)
>
> When would we need an audit container ID when audit is not enabled
> enough to have an audit_context?

I'm thinking of the audit_alloc() case where audit_filter_task()
returns AUDIT_DISABLED.

I believe this is the same reason why loginuid and sessionid live
directly in the task_struct and not in the audit_context; they need to
persist for the lifetime of the task.

> If it is only used for audit, and audit is the only consumer, and audit
> can only use it when it is enabled, then we can just return success to
> any write to the proc filehandle, or not even present it. Nothing will
> be able to know that value wasn't used.
>
> When are loginuid and sessionid used now when audit is not enabled (or
> should I say, explicitly disabled)?

See above. I think that should answer these questions.

>> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> > index 4e61a9e..921a71f 100644
>> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
>> > #define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */
>> > #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */
>> > #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */
>> > +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1020 /* Define the container id and information */
>> >
>> > #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
>> > #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
>> > @@ -465,6 +466,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {
>> > };
>> >
>> > #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
>> > +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)
>>
>> I think we need to decide if we want to distinguish between the "host"
>> (e.g. init ns) and "unset". Looking at this patch (I've only quickly
>> skimmed the others so far) it would appear that you don't think we
>> need to worry about this distinction; that's fine, but let's make it
>> explicit with a comment in the code that AUDIT_CID_UNSET means "unset"
>> as well as "host".
>
> I don't see any reason to distinguish between "host" and "unset". Since
> a container doesn't have a concrete definition based in namespaces, the
> initial namespace set is meaningless here.

Okay, that sounds reasonable.

> Is there value in having a container orchestrator process have a
> reserved container ID that has a policy distinct from any other
> container?

I'm open to arguments for this idea, but I don't see a point to it right now.

> If so, then I could see the value in making the distinction.
> For example, I've heard of interest in systemd acting as a container
> orchestrator, so if it took on that role as PID 1, then every process in
> the system would inherit that ID and none would be unset.
>
> I can't picture how having seperate "host" and "unset" values helps us.

I don't have a strong feeling either way, I just wanted to ask the question.

>> > /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
>> > * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
>> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > index 4e0a4ac..29c8482 100644
>> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > @@ -2073,6 +2073,90 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
>> > return rc;
>> > }
>> >
>> > +static int audit_set_containerid_perm(struct task_struct *task, u64 containerid)
>> > +{
>> > + struct task_struct *parent;
>> > + u64 pcontainerid, ccontainerid;
>> > +
>> > + /* Don't allow to set our own containerid */
>> > + if (current == task)
>> > + return -EPERM;
>>
>> Why not? Is there some obvious security concern that I missing?
>
> We then lose the distinction in the AUDIT_CONTAINER record between the
> initiating PID and the target PID. This was outlined in the proposal.

I just went back and reread the v3 proposal and I still don't see a
good explanation of this. Why is this bad? What's the security
concern?

> Having said that, I'm still not sure we have protected sufficiently from
> a child turning around and setting it's parent's as yet unset or
> inherited audit container ID.

Yes, I believe we only want to let a task set the audit container for
it's children (or itself/threads if we decide to allow that, see
above). There *has* to be a function to check to see if a task if a
child of a given task ... right? ... although this is likely to be a
pointer traversal and locking nightmare ... hmmm.

>> I ask because I suppose it might be possible for some container
>> runtime to do a fork, setup some of the environment and them exec the
>> container (before you answer the obvious "namespaces!" please remember
>> we're not trying to define containers).
>
> I don't think namespaces have any bearing on this concern since none are
> required.
>
>> > + /* Don't allow the containerid to be unset */
>> > + if (!cid_valid(containerid))
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
>> > + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
>> > + return -EPERM;
>> > + /* if containerid is unset, allow */
>> > + if (!audit_containerid_set(task))
>> > + return 0;
>> > + /* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */
>> > + ccontainerid = audit_get_containerid(task);
>> > + rcu_read_lock();
>> > + parent = rcu_dereference(task->real_parent);
>> > + rcu_read_unlock();
>> > + task_lock(parent);
>> > + pcontainerid = audit_get_containerid(parent);
>> > + task_unlock(parent);
>> > + if (ccontainerid != pcontainerid)
>> > + return -EPERM;
>> > + return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static void audit_log_set_containerid(struct task_struct *task, u64 oldcontainerid,
>> > + u64 containerid, int rc)
>> > +{
>> > + struct audit_buffer *ab;
>> > + uid_t uid;
>> > + struct tty_struct *tty;
>> > +
>> > + if (!audit_enabled)
>> > + return;
>> > +
>> > + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER);
>> > + if (!ab)
>> > + return;
>> > +
>> > + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
>> > + tty = audit_get_tty(current);
>> > +
>> > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
>> > + audit_log_task_context(ab);
>> > + audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu res=%d",
>> > + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
>> > + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", audit_get_sessionid(current),
>> > + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontainerid, containerid, !rc);
>> > +
>> > + audit_put_tty(tty);
>> > + audit_log_end(ab);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +/**
>> > + * audit_set_containerid - set current task's audit_context containerid
>> > + * @containerid: containerid value
>> > + *
>> > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
>> > + *
>> > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_containerid_write().
>> > + */
>> > +int audit_set_containerid(struct task_struct *task, u64 containerid)
>> > +{
>> > + u64 oldcontainerid;
>> > + int rc;
>> > +
>> > + oldcontainerid = audit_get_containerid(task);
>> > +
>> > + rc = audit_set_containerid_perm(task, containerid);
>> > + if (!rc) {
>> > + task_lock(task);
>> > + task->containerid = containerid;
>> > + task_unlock(task);
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + audit_log_set_containerid(task, oldcontainerid, containerid, rc);
>> > + return rc;
>>
>> Why are audit_set_containerid_perm() and audit_log_containerid()
>> separate functions?
>
> (I assume you mean audit_log_set_containerid()?)

Yep. My fingers got tired typing in that function name and decided a
shortcut was necessary.

> It seemed clearer that all the permission checking was in one function
> and its return code could be used to report the outcome when logging the
> (attempted) action. This is the same structure as audit_set_loginuid()
> and it made sense.

When possible I really like it when the permission checks are in the
same function as the code which does the work; it's less likely to get
abused that way (you have to willfully bypass the access checks). The
exceptions might be if you wanted to reuse the access control code, or
insert a modular access mechanism (e.g. LSMs).

I'm less concerned about audit_log_set_containerid(), but the usual
idea of avoiding single-use function within the same scope applies
here.

> This would be the time to connect it to a syscall if that seems like a
> good idea and remove pid, uid, auid, tty, ses fields.

Ah yes, I missed that. You know my stance on connecting records by
now (hint: yes, connect them) so I think that would be a good thing to
do for the next round.

--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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