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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Relax constraints on ID feature bits
On 08/03/18 17:11, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 03:11:31PM +0000, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>> On 26/02/18 18:05, Will Deacon wrote:
>>> On Wed, Feb 07, 2018 at 02:21:05PM +0000, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:

>>>> ---
>>>> Changes since v1:
>>>> - Make ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1:LOR/HPD, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1:LSM non-strict
>>>> as they aren't used by the kernel.
>>>> - Added comments around different fields.
>>>> - Make ID_AA64MMFR2:CNP non-strict, as we could decide to use it
>>>> only when it is available on all the CPUs.
>>> This does mean we need to be careful when adding support for a new feature
>>> because the cpufeature code is no longer guaranteeing homogeneity. I can't
>>> see how we can detect this, so I suppose we'll just need to be careful to
>>> pick this up during review.
>>> It's also a bit nasty that older kernels won't shout about mismatched
>>> features but a new kernel might.
>> That is not correct. It is the opposite. The new kernel won't shout about
>> mismatched features, where the old kernel complains.
> What I mean is, with your patches applied, it's likely that the kernel won't
> shout about mismatched features. If we ever change something in future that
> results in us requiring STRICT matching (perhaps supporting a new version of
> a feature), then we're introducing a taint which wasn't there before. Maybe
> not a big deal, but I'm not sold on the rationale for this patch.
>> I have a slight concern that this means
>>> integration problems might slip through the cracks when a design is
>>> validating against an older kernel.
>>> Finally, there's still the problem that some features cannot be
>>> enabled/disabled by the kernel and we can end up in a position where a
>>> user application might SIGILL only on some CPUs if it's using an instruction
>>> that isn't supported across the whole system. I think that sort of
>>> configuration *does* warrant the current sanity check message/taint; afaict
>>> we still go ahead and use the safe value, clobbering things like the hwcap,
>>> but we should draw attention to the fact that userspace might crash if it's
>>> trying to probe for these instructions using traps.
>> The FTR_STRICT only affects whether we should issue a WARNING and TAINT the kernel
>> if there is a mismatch. It doesn't affect the "safe" value calculation. So,
>> I don't understand how the above situation can be triggered by this change.
> I'm saying that I think the taint is justified.

Ok. I am OK with dropping this patch for now. If there is a demand for this
change, we could always look at it in the future. I will send the updated 8.4
HWCAP patch.


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