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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
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On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter
> of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a
> comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation,

This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library
isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or
generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really
the case? Do you have some further data around this?


       -  twiz

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