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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] lzo: fix ip overrun during compress.
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Hi,

I don't think that address space wraparound is legal in C, but I
understand that we are in kernel land and if you really want to
compress the last virtual page 0xfffffffffffff000 the following
small patch should fix that dubious case.

This also avoids slowing down the the hot path of the compression
core function.

Cheers,
Markus



diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
index 236eb21167b5..959dec45f6fe 100644
--- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
+++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,

while (l > 20) {
size_t ll = l <= (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1) ? l : (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1);
- uintptr_t ll_end = (uintptr_t) ip + ll;
- if ((ll_end + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= ll_end)
+ // check for address space wraparound
+ if (((uintptr_t) ip + ll + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= (uintptr_t) ip)
break;
BUILD_BUG_ON(D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t) > LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS);
memset(wrkmem, 0, D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t));


On 2018-11-28 14:52, David Sterba wrote:
> Adding Markus to to CC
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 07:31:26AM +0000, Yueyi Li wrote:
>> It`s possible ip overrun in lzo1x_1_do_compress() when compressed page is
>> point to the end of memory and which virtual address is 0xfffffffffffff000.
>> Leading to a NULL pointer access during the get_unaligned_le32(ip).
>
> So this could happen in practice in zram, but unlikely for other users
> of lzo (like btrfs). I'm not sure but expect that the last page would
> not be returned by allocator.
>
> The fix is adding a few branches to code that's supposed to be as fast
> as possible. The branches would be evaluated all the time while
> protecting against one signle bad page address. This does not look like
> a good performance tradeoff.
>
>> +#define OVERFLOW_ADD_CHECK(a, b) \
>> + (((a) + (b)) < (a))
>
> I'm not sure if this is generally safe overflow check (never not
> optimized out). Here it depends on the types of 'a' and 'b' that are
> pointer (ip) and size_t (m_len). GCC has __builtin_add_overflow_p so
> that one should be used where possible.
>

--
Markus Oberhumer, <markus@oberhumer.com>, http://www.oberhumer.com/

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