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SubjectRe: STIBP by default.. Revert?
Linus Torvalds <> writes:

> On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 2:17 PM Jiri Kosina <> wrote:
>> Which gets us back to Tim's fixup patch. Do you still prefer the revert,
>> given the existence of that?
> I don't think the code needs to be reverted, but the *behavior* of
> just unconditionally enabling STIBP needs to be reverted.

Actually I think it should be reverted. Yes of course opt-in
is needed.

But also when you opt-in it doesn't make sense to set STIBP
when the sibling is running the same security context, which
is actually a common case. So to even use it properly you would
need some scheduler support to detect these cases and only
enable it then with opt-in. These patches didn't even try to tackle
this problem.


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