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SubjectRe: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver
On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 5:08 PM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
>
> SGX driver provides a ioctl API for loading and initializing enclaves.
> Address range for enclaves is reserved with mmap() and they are
> destroyed with munmap(). Enclave construction, measurement and
> initialization is done with the provided the ioctl API.
>

I brought this up a while back, and I think I should re-ask it now
that this driver is getting close to ready:

As it stands, there's just one SGX character device, and I imagine
that it'll be available to unprivileged applications. I'm concerned
that this isn't quite what we want. I certainly think that everyone,
or at least almost everyone, ought to be able to run normal enclaves.
But I think that we should consider restricting who can run specially
privileged enclaves. In particular, the ability to run enclaves with
the provisioning bit set is somewhat sensitive, since it effectively
allows access to a stable fingerprint of the system. Before flexible
LC, this wasn't such a big deal, since only Intel's provisioning
enclave could see the key, and Intel's enclave has some degree of
control of what is done with the key. With flex LC, this protection
is lost.

But this is maybe more of a big deal than just access to a stable
fingerprint. The ability to provision a remote attestation protocol
is a key part of running SGX malware, and SGX malware is surely going
to exist some day. (Sure, Intel will try to block access to the
actual attestation service for malware, but I doubt that Intel will be
able to fully defend it.)

So I propose that there be a few device nodes. Maybe
/dev/sgx/unprivilegd and /dev/sgx/provisioning? The default mode of
the latter could be 0600. If you've opened the unprivileged node, you
can only run enclaves without any special permission bits set.

We should also consider whether we allow the unprivileged node to run
launch enclaves, and, for that matter, whether we allow user code to
run launch enclaves at all, given that they're not useful with the
current architecture of the driver.

--Andy

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