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SubjectRe: [PATCH] proc: allow killing processes via file descriptors
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 4:53 PM, Daniel Colascione <> wrote:
>> Sure, I'd propose that ptrace_may_access() is what we should use for
>> operation permission checks.
> The tricky part is that ptrace_may_access takes a struct task. We want
> logic that's *like* ptrace_may_access, but that works posthumously.
> It's especially tricky because there's an LSM hook that lets
> __ptrace_may_access do arbitrary things. And we can't just run that
> hook upon process death, since *after* a process dies, a process
> holding an exithand FD (or whatever we call it) may pass that FD to
> another process, and *that* process can read(2) from it.
> Another option is doing the exithand access check at open time. I
> think that's probably fine, and it would make things a lot simpler.
> But if we use this option, we should understand what we're doing, and
> get some security-conscious people to think through the implications.

A ptrace check is also probably too strict. Yama's ptrace_scope
feature will block ptrace between unrelated processes within a single
user context, but applying this restriction to exit code monitoring
seems too severe to me.

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