lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Nov]   [15]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
From
Date
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 10:55 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
> copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
> When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
> sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively,
> information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
> to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.
>
> No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
> UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
> UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.
>
> Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
> Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
> helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6+
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

> ---
> drivers/hid/uhid.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> index 3c55073136064..051639c09f728 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/atomic.h>
> #include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> #include <linux/device.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/hid.h>
> @@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
>
> switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
> case UHID_CREATE:
> + /*
> + * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
> + * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
> + * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
> + */
> + if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {
> + pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",
> + task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + goto unlock;
> + }
> ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf);
> break;
> case UHID_CREATE2:
> --
> 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog
>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-11-14 23:35    [W:0.125 / U:1.232 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site