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SubjectRe: [Patch v2 1/4] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2
On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> +enum spectre_v2_app2app_mitigation {
> + SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE,
> + SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE,
> + SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT,
> +};
>
> static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
> SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
>
> +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_app2app_enabled __ro_after_init =

Copy and paste. The enum type is wrong.

> + SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE;
> +

> +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_app2app_cmdline(void)

Ditto

> +{
> + char arg[20];
> + int ret, i;
> + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_AUTO;

Please use reverse fir tree ordering of the variables:

enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_AUTO;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;

> +
> + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_app2app", arg, sizeof(arg));

Line break around 78 please

> @@ -325,6 +383,9 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>
> static bool stibp_needed(void)
> {
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
> + return false;
> +
> if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
> return false;
>
> @@ -366,7 +427,9 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
> static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> {
> enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
> + enum spectre_v2_app2app_mitigation_cmd app2app_cmd = spectre_v2_parse_app2app_cmdline();

Please avoid these overlong lines. Move the initialization to the code if
it does not fit into the declaration part.

> enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
> + enum spectre_v2_app2app_mitigation app2app_mode = SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE;

> /*
> * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
> @@ -376,6 +439,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
> return;
>
> + switch (app2app_cmd) {
> + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_LITE:
> + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_AUTO:
> + app2app_mode = SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE;
> + break;
> +
> + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_STRICT:
> + app2app_mode = SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> switch (cmd) {
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
> return;
> @@ -427,6 +501,11 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> }
>
> specv2_set_mode:
> + spectre_v2_app2app_enabled = app2app_mode;
> + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_app2app_strings[app2app_mode]);
> + if (app2app_mode == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE)
> + static_branch_enable(&spectre_v2_app_lite);
> +
> spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
> pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
>
> @@ -441,8 +520,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
> pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
>
> - /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
> + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported and not disabled */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && app2app_mode != SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE) {

Line breaks exist for a reason. Applies to comments and code.

> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
> pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
> }
> @@ -875,8 +954,16 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
>
> case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
> mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
> - ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
> - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
> + ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB-lite" : "",
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
> + (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
> + spectre_v2_module_string());
> + else
> + ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB-strict" : "",
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
> (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",

Why do you need to copy the whole thing? What's wrong with using
spectre_v2_app2app_enabled for getting the proper string for the IBPB
mitigation?

> - * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
> - * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to
> + * For lite protection mode, we only protect the non-dumpable
> + * processes.
> + *
> + * Otherwise check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
> + * of the @tsk (next) task for strict app to app protection.
> + * If access is denied, make sure to
> * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks.
> *
> * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO.
> */
> - return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
> - __ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB));

Needs to be updated to the latest code in tip x86/pti

> + /* skip IBPB if no context changes */
> + if (!tsk || !tsk->mm || tsk->mm->context.ctx_id == last_ctx_id)
> + return false;
> +
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
> + return (get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER);
> + else
> + return (__ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB));

Neither of the branches needs braces for the return

Thanks,

tglx

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