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SubjectRe: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection
On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 09:43:35AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 10/19/2018 12:57 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> >> Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address
> >> space layout randomization in applications and the need to know an
> >
> > Does the BTB attack on KASLR not work for userspace?
> >
> With KASLR, you can probe the kernel mapped and unmapped
> addresses with side channels like TLB and infer the kernel mapping
> offsets much more easily, as kernel is in the same address
> space as the attack process. It is a lot harder to do
> such probing from another process that doesn't share the
> same page tables.

I said BTB; see:

From what I understood, local ASLR (of any kind) is a pipe dream.

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