Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Mon, 8 Jan 2018 08:13:09 -0800 | From | Alexei Starovoitov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel |
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On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 02:42:13AM -0800, Paul Turner wrote: > > kernel->kernel independent of SMEP: > While much harder to coordinate, facilities such as eBPF potentially > allow exploitable return targets to be created. > Generally speaking (particularly if eBPF has been disabled) the risk > is _much_ lower here, since we can only return into kernel execution > that was already occurring on another thread (which could e.g. likely > be attacked there directly independent of RSB poisoning.)
we can remove bpf interpreter without losing features: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856694/ Ironically JIT is more secure than interpreter.
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