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SubjectRe: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
On Sun, 7 Jan 2018, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> We need to fix the security problem, but we need to do it *without*
> these braindead arguments that performance is somehow secondary.

I surely agree, but we have gone the way of PTI without the ability of
exempting individual processes exactly for one reason:

Lack of time

It can be done on top of the PTI implementation and it won't take ages.

For spectre_v1/2 we face the same problem simply because we got informed so
much ahead of time and we were all twiddling thumbs, enjoying our christmas
vacation and having a good time.

The exploits are out in the wild and they are observed already, so we
really have to make a decision whether we want to fix that in the most
obvious ways even if it hurts performance right now and then take a break
from all that hell and sit down and sort the performance mess or whether we
want to discuss the right way to fix it for the next 3 month and leave all
doors open until the last bit of performance is squeezed out.

I totally can understand the anger of those who learned all of this a few
days ago and are now grasping straws to avoid the obviously coming
performance hit, but its not our fault that we have to make a decision
which cannot make everyone happy tomorrow.

If the general sentiment is that we have to fix the performance issue
first, then please let me know and I take 3 weeks of vacation right now.

Thanks,

tglx

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