Messages in this thread |  | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] KVM: Expose speculation control feature to guests | From | Paolo Bonzini <> | Date | Tue, 30 Jan 2018 19:16:38 -0500 |
| |
On 30/01/2018 18:48, Raj, Ashok wrote: >> Certainly not every vmexit! But doing it on every userspace vmexit and >> every sched_out would not be *that* bad. > Right.. agreed. We discussed the different scenarios that doing IBPB > on VMexit would help, and decided its really not required on every exit. > > One obvious case is when there is a VMexit and return back to Qemu > process (witout a real context switch) do we need that to be > protected from any poisoned BTB from guest?
If the host is using retpolines, then some kind of barrier is needed. I don't know if the full PRED_CMD barrier is needed, or two IBRS=1/IBRS=0 writes back-to-back are enough.
If the host is using IBRS, then writing IBRS=1 at vmexit has established a barrier from the less privileged VMX guest environment.
Paolo
> If Qemu is protected by !dumpable/retpoline that should give that gaurantee. > We do VM->VM IBPB at vmload() time that should provide that gaurantee.
|  |