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Subject[PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
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Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall'
protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling
will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for
now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 390b3dc3d438..06f1d4c5ec6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}

ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
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