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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 08:07:06PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> That bug is the *reason* we're arguing about static_cpu_has vs.
> A conditional branch that the CPU sees can be speculated over...

Lemme see if I understand it correctly: you don't want to have any such

testb $1,boot_cpu_data+50(%rip) #, MEM[(const char *)&boot_cpu_data + 50B]
jnz .L707 #

which could cause any speculation.

Instead, you want to have unconditional code which is slapped in by

Oh, and you don't want to have that at privilege crossing sites, like
VMEXIT or so.

Am I close?

> Now, Andrew is right that in a number of cases there will be another
> serialising instruction before we ever hit a problematic indirect
> branch. But as I just said elsewhere, I'd really like the *primitives*
> to support unconditional operation.

In this particular case, WRMSR is already serializing too. So it is hard
to exploit stuff here :-)


Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

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