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SubjectRe: [tip:x86/pti] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs
On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 6:42 AM, Arjan van de Ven <> wrote:
>> This would means that userspace would see return predictions based
>> on the values the kernel 'stuffed' into the RSB to fill it.
>> Potentially this leaks a kernel address to userspace.
> KASLR pretty much died in May this year to be honest with the KAISER paper
> (if not before then)

KASLR was always on shaky ground for local attacks. For pure remote
attacks, it's still useful. And for driving forward research, it
appears to be quite useful. ;)


Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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