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SubjectRe: [PATCH 4/4] selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing
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On 08/02/2017 10:19 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> SECCOMP_RET_KILL is supposed to kill the current thread (and userspace
> depends on this), so test for this, distinct from killing the entire
> process. This also tests killing the entire process with the new
> SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS flag. (This also moves a bunch of
> defines up earlier in the file to use them earlier.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> index ee78a53da5d1..68b9faf23ca6 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> @@ -87,6 +87,51 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> };
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __NR_seccomp
> +# if defined(__i386__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 354
> +# elif defined(__x86_64__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 317
> +# elif defined(__arm__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 383
> +# elif defined(__aarch64__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 277
> +# elif defined(__hppa__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 338
> +# elif defined(__powerpc__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 358
> +# elif defined(__s390__)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 348
> +# else
> +# warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"
> +# define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
> +# endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS 2
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef seccomp
> +int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
> +{
> + errno = 0;
> + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
> #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
> #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
> @@ -520,6 +565,102 @@ TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_six, SIGSYS)
> close(fd);
> }
>
> +/* This is a thread task to die via seccomp filter violation. */
> +void *kill_thread(void *data)
> +{
> + bool die = (bool)data;
> +
> + if (die) {
> + prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> + return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
> + }
> +
> + return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
> +}
> +
> +/* Prepare a thread that will kill itself or both of us. */
> +void kill_thread_or_group(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, bool kill_process)
> +{
> + pthread_t thread;
> + void *status;
> + unsigned int flags;
> + /* Kill only when calling __NR_prctl. */
> + struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
> + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
> + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
> + };
> + struct sock_fprog prog = {
> + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
> + .filter = filter,
> + };
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
> + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
> + }
> +
> + flags = kill_process ? SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS : 0;
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog)) {
> + if (kill_process)
> + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS");
> + else
> + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall");
> + }
> +
> + /* Start a thread that will exit immediately. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)false));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
> + ASSERT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (unsigned long)status);
> +
> + /* Start a thread that will die immediately. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)true));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
> + ASSERT_NE(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (unsigned long)status);
> +
> + /* Only the thread died. Let parent know this thread didn't die. */

This read a little odd to me. How about, "Only the created thread died.
Let parent know the this creating thread didn't die."?

> + exit(42);
> +}
> +
> +TEST(KILL_thread)
> +{
> + int status;
> + pid_t child_pid;
> +
> + child_pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
> + if (child_pid == 0) {
> + kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, false);
> + _exit(38);
> + }
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
> +
> + /* If only the thread was killed, we'll see exit 42. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));

This is probably nitpicky but, after reading the wait(2) man page, I
feel like this should be ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status)) instead of
comparing to 1. There's no documented guarantee that 1 will be returned.

> + ASSERT_EQ(42, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(KILL_process)
> +{
> + int status;
> + pid_t child_pid;
> +
> + child_pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
> + if (child_pid == 0) {
> + kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, true);
> + _exit(38);
> + }
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
> +
> + /* If the entire process was killed, we'll see SIGSYS. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSIGNALED(status));

Same here. ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status)).

With these small changes,

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

Tyler

> + ASSERT_EQ(SIGSYS, WTERMSIG(status));
> +}
> +
> /* TODO(wad) add 64-bit versus 32-bit arg tests. */
> TEST(arg_out_of_range)
> {
> @@ -1675,47 +1816,6 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_ptrace, SIGSYS)
> EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
> }
>
> -#ifndef __NR_seccomp
> -# if defined(__i386__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 354
> -# elif defined(__x86_64__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 317
> -# elif defined(__arm__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 383
> -# elif defined(__aarch64__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 277
> -# elif defined(__hppa__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 338
> -# elif defined(__powerpc__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 358
> -# elif defined(__s390__)
> -# define __NR_seccomp 348
> -# else
> -# warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"
> -# define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
> -# endif
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
> -#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
> -#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef seccomp
> -int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
> -{
> - errno = 0;
> - return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> TEST(seccomp_syscall)
> {
> struct sock_filter filter[] = {
>


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