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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 2/6] seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
On 2017-08-04 17:24:00, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 08/03/2017 11:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 1:55 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that
> >> are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not
> >> be logged.
> >>
> >> For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
> >> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were
> >> written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged
> >> since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl
> >> value.
> >
> > Just to make sure I'm clear on this, the key word above is "loggable",
> > in that filters requesting logging will be seen.
> >
> > i.e. at the end of the series, the final state of "will it be logged?" is:
> >
> > if action==RET_ALLOW:
> > do not log
> > else if action==RET_KILL || audit-enabled:
> > log
> > else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
> > log
> > else:
> > do not log
>
> Not quite. You didn't mention RET_LOG, RET_KILL (and RET_LOG) can be
> quieted by the admin, and the audit behavior is different. It is like this:
>
> if action == RET_ALLOW:
> do not log
> else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
> log
> else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
> log
> else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
> log
> else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
> log
> else:
> do not log
>
> Writing that up made me realize that there is a behavior change that my
> patch set introduces when the process is being audited. Before my patch
> set, this was the behavior:
>
> ...
> else if action == RET_KILL && audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
> log
> ...
>
> Now it is:
>
> ...
> else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
> log
> ...
>
> Should I go back to only logging RET_KILL actions in that situation?
>
> >
> >> The path to the sysctl is:
> >>
> >> /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged
> >>
> >> The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
> >> that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of
> >> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. It cannot be configured for logging.
> >>
> >> The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged
> >> except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW.
> >>
> >> There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
> >> specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
> >> allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
> >> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception
> >> preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
> >> audit context.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
> >> ---
> >>
> >> * Changes since v4:
> >> - the sysctl is now a list of actions that are allowed by the admin to be
> >> logged rather than a list of actions that should be logged
> >> + a follow up patch will let applications have a say in what should be
> >> logged but the admin has the final say with this sysctl
> >> + RET_ALLOW cannot be allowed to be logged
> >> - fix comment style
> >> - mark the seccomp_action_names array as const
> >> - adjust for new reStructuredText format
> >>
> >> Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 18 +++
> >> include/linux/audit.h | 6 +-
> >> kernel/seccomp.c | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >> 3 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> >> index 35fc7cb..2d1d8ab 100644
> >> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> >> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> >> @@ -187,6 +187,24 @@ directory. Here's a description of each file in that directory:
> >> program was built, differs from the set of actions actually
> >> supported in the current running kernel.
> >>
> >> +``actions_logged``:
> >> + A read-write ordered list of seccomp return values (refer to the
> >> + ``SECCOMP_RET_*`` macros above) that are allowed to be logged. Writes
> >> + to the file do not need to be in ordered form but reads from the file
> >> + will be ordered in the same way as the actions_avail sysctl.
> >> +
> >> + It is important to note that the value of ``actions_logged`` does not
> >> + prevent certain actions from being logged when the audit subsystem is
> >> + configured to audit a task. If the action is not found in
> >> + ``actions_logged`` list, the final decision on whether to audit the
> >> + action for that task is ultimately left up to the audit subsystem to
> >> + decide for all seccomp return values other than ``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW``.
> >> +
> >> + The ``allow`` string is not accepted in the ``actions_logged`` sysctl
> >> + as it is not possible to log ``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW`` actions. Attempting
> >> + to write ``allow`` to the sysctl will result in an EINVAL being
> >> + returned.
> >> +
> >> Adding architecture support
> >> ===========================
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> >> index 2150bdc..8c30f06 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -314,11 +314,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
> >>
> >> static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
> >> {
> >> - if (!audit_enabled)
> >> - return;
> >> -
> >> - /* Force a record to be reported if a signal was delivered. */
> >> - if (signr || unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> >> + if (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> >> __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
> >> }
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> index 6bff068..87257f2 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> @@ -516,6 +516,52 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
> >> }
> >> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
> >>
> >> +/* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */
> >> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL (1 << 0)
> >> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2)
> >> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3)
> >> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
> >> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 5)
> >> +
> >> +static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL | SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP |
> >> + SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO | SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
> >> +
> >> +static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action)
> >> +{
> >> + bool log;
> >> +
> >> + switch (action) {
> >> + case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
> >> + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP;
> >> + break;
> >> + case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
> >> + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO;
> >> + break;
> >> + case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
> >> + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
> >> + break;
> >> + case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
> >> + log = false;
> >> + break;
> >> + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
> >> + default:
> >> + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is allowed to
> >> + * be logged by the admin.
> >> + */
> >> + if (log)
> >> + return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
> >
> > At this point in the patch series, there's no filter-requested-logging
> > flag, so I think the above logic isn't needed until later in the
> > series (or rather, only RET_KILL should be checked).
>
> Hmmm... you're right. This slipped in since the sysctl's purpose morphed
> from configuring what actions should be logged to configuring what
> actions are allowed to be logged.
>
> >
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based
> >> + * on whether the current task itself is being audited.
> >> + */
> >> + return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
> >
> > With audit_seccomp() being a single if, maybe it should just be
> > collapsed into this function?
> >
> > if (log || (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> > audit_seccomp(...)
>
> I think that would be fine. Unless you say otherwise, I'll also rename
> __audit_seccomp() to audit_seccomp() after doing that.

After looking at making this change, the common pattern is for
include/linux/audit.h to have a function such as this...

static inline audit_foo(...)
{
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
__audit_foo(...);
}

... and then for kernel/auditsc.c to contain __audit_foo() which
actually constructs and emits the audit message.

I don't feel like I should deviate from this pattern and should leave
this part of the patch alone.

Tyler

> >
> > I do like the change in name, though: this new function is correctly
> > named seccomp_log().
> >
> > -Kees
> >
>
>
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