| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 4.14 075/159] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow | Date | Fri, 22 Dec 2017 09:46:00 +0100 |
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4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit d3a09104018cf2ad5973dfa8a9c138ef9f5015a3 upstream.
If the stack overflows into a guard page and the ORC unwinder should work well: by construction, there can't be any meaningful data in the guard page because no writes to the guard page will have succeeded.
But there is a bug that prevents unwinding from working correctly: if the starting register state has RSP pointing into a stack guard page, the ORC unwinder bails out immediately.
Instead of bailing out immediately check whether the next page up is a valid check page and if so analyze that. As a result the ORC unwinder will start the unwind.
Tested by intentionally overflowing the task stack. The result is an accurate call trace instead of a trace consisting purely of '?' entries.
There are a few other bugs that are triggered if the unwinder encounters a stack overflow after the first step, but they are outside the scope of this fix.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150604.991389777@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
--- arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c @@ -553,8 +553,18 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state } if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task, - &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) - return; + &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) { + /* + * We weren't on a valid stack. It's possible that + * we overflowed a valid stack into a guard page. + * See if the next page up is valid so that we can + * generate some kind of backtrace if this happens. + */ + void *next_page = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)state->sp); + if (get_stack_info(next_page, state->task, &state->stack_info, + &state->stack_mask)) + return; + } /* * The caller can provide the address of the first frame directly
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