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SubjectRe: [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons
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On 14/09/2016 21:07, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:24:00AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Add eBPF functions to compare file system access with a Landlock file
>> system handle:
>> * bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file(prop, map, map_op, file)
>> This function allows to compare the dentry, inode, device or mount
>> point of the currently accessed file, with a reference handle.
>> * bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath_with_struct_file(opt, map, map_op, file)
>> This function allows an eBPF program to check if the current accessed
>> file is the same or in the hierarchy of a reference handle.
> [...]
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
>> index 94256597eacd..edaab4c87292 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
>> @@ -603,6 +605,9 @@ static void landlock_put_handle(struct map_landlock_handle *handle)
>> enum bpf_map_handle_type handle_type = handle->type;
>>
>> switch (handle_type) {
>> + case BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD:
>> + path_put(&handle->path);
>> + break;
>> case BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_UNSPEC:
>> default:
>> WARN_ON(1);
> [...]
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/checker_fs.c b/security/landlock/checker_fs.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..39eb85dc7d18
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/landlock/checker_fs.c
> [...]
>> +static inline u64 bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file(u64 r1_property,
>> + u64 r2_map, u64 r3_map_op, u64 r4_file, u64 r5)
>> +{
>> + u8 property = (u8) r1_property;
>> + struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r2_map;
>> + enum bpf_map_array_op map_op = r3_map_op;
>> + struct file *file = (struct file *) (unsigned long) r4_file;
>> + struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
>> + struct path *p1, *p2;
>> + struct map_landlock_handle *handle;
>> + int i;
>
> Please don't use int when iterating over an array, use size_t.

OK, I will use size_t.

>
>
>> + /* for now, only handle OP_OR */
>
> Is "OP_OR" an appropriate name for something that ANDs the success of
> checks?
>
>
> [...]
>> + synchronize_rcu();
>
> Can you put a comment here that explains what's going on?

Hum, this should not be here.

>
>
>> + for (i = 0; i < array->n_entries; i++) {
>> + bool result_dentry = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_DENTRY);
>> + bool result_inode = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_INODE);
>> + bool result_device = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_DEVICE);
>> + bool result_mount = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_MOUNT);
>> +
>> + handle = (struct map_landlock_handle *)
>> + (array->value + array->elem_size * i);
>> +
>> + if (handle->type != BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD) {
>> + WARN_ON(1);
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + }
>> + p1 = &handle->path;
>> +
>> + if (!result_dentry && p1->dentry == p2->dentry)
>> + result_dentry = true;
>
> Why is this safe? As far as I can tell, this is not in an RCU read-side
> critical section (synchronize_rcu() was just called), and no lock has been
> taken. What prevents someone from removing the arraymap entry while we're
> looking at it? Am I missing something?

I will try to properly deal with RCU.

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