[lkml]   [2014]   [Dec]   [22]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH] ASLRv3: randomize_va_space=3 preventing offset2lib attack
On Mon, 22 Dec 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> It could be worth having a mode that goes all out: randomize every
> single allocation independently in, say, a 45 or 46-byte range. That
> would be about as strong ASLR as we could possibly have, it would
> result in guard intervals around mmap data allocations (which has real
> value), and it would still leave plenty of space for big address space
> hogs like the Chromium sandbox.
> The main downside would be lots of memory used for page tables.

Plus get_random_int() during every mmap() call. Plus the resulting VA
space fragmentation.

Jiri Kosina

 \ /
  Last update: 2014-12-22 21:21    [W:0.512 / U:0.004 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site